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CURRENT DECISIONS

tribution of electric power was a necessary adjunct to its sale, and not a
separate product.'8 On this basis alone, the court could have effectively
disposed of the controversy
The decision in Washington Gas Light is unnecessarily broad, relying
on the state action immunity doctrine to resolve an issue which is far
from the classic state action situation presented in Parker In so doing,
the court implies that acts committed by state-regulated industries, if
condoned by the regulatory agency, are not reviewable under federal
antitrust laws. Such a result can only obstruct uniform enforcement of
the Sherman Act, and may present serious difficulties with respect to
4
-the federal supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.1
RICHARD

B. BLACKWELL

Constitutional Law-Am :TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 91 S.Ct. -2105-(1971)
Taxpayers sought to enjoin expenditures of funds under a Pennsylvania statute' which authorized the state to purchase selected secular
educational services from nonpublic schools. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.2 The Supreme
Court reversed, and held that the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment' because the act resulted in excessive government en4
tanglement with religion.
Sherman Act, the supplier refuses to sell the consumer product "A" (generally a scarce
or otherwise required commodity) unless the consumer also agrees to buy product
"B" (usually of much less demand value and at an inflated price). In this way the
supplier creates a false market for product "B", the tied product, and thereby imposes
an illegal restraint of trade. Cf. Former Enterprises v. Umted States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969).
13. 438 F.2d at 254, quoting front Gas Light Co., of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co.,
313 F Supp. 860, 869 (M.D. Ga. 1970).
14. U.S. CONST. art VI.
1. Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN.nt. 24, § 5601

(Supp. 1968).
2. Lemon v. Kurtman, 310 F Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
" U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I.
4. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Lemon is part of a trilogy of
cases decided on the same day See DiCenso v. Robinson, 9i S. Cr. 2105 (1971); Tilton
v. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. 2091 (1971)
In DiCenso, the Court invalidated the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act of 1969
which provided public funds as salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
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Previously, the Court has held that the establishment clause is not
violated by a statute authorizing reimbursement of fares paid for the
transportation of children to parochial schools, 5 or by a statute requiring
school boards to loan secular textbooks, without charge, to parochial
school children." In addition, the grantmg of a tax-exempt status to
7
church schools has been held not to violate the establishment clause.
However, religious instruction, the establishment of an official prayer, 9
or readings from the Bible'0 in public school facilities have been held
to be violative of the establishment clause.
In Everson v. Board of Education," the Court first enunciated the
test by which alleged violations of the establishment clause are to be
judged, saying, "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions." 12 However, under
the free exercise clause, state law benefits must be extended to "all citizens without regard to their religious belief." "1 Therefore, under the
parochial schools. Payment, unlike in Lemon, went to individual teachers instead of to
schools. The excessive entanglement of government with religion, in both cases, arose
from the necessity of government surveillance of religious schools in order to insure
school compliance with the laws.
In Tilton, the Court upheld, in part, the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963
which provides federal construction grants to public and private colleges. While allowing four Catholic colleges to use the grants for "religiously neutral" buildings the Court
distinguished Tilton from Lemon and DiCenso on three grounds: 1) there is less
danger that religion will seep into college classes than into pre-college classes; 2) the
Tilton aid is religiously neutral; and 3) one-time grants are not continuing as are salary
supplements. Together, these factors meant that government and religion were not
excessively entangled.
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
7. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
8. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But cf. Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952), holding that public school students, upon the written request of
their parents, may be released from public school during school hours in order to receive
religious instruction because a "released time" program does not require public classrooms
or public funds.
9. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) But see Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F Supp. 757
(E.D.N.Y, 1963), stating that if prayer is voluntary and without coercion, the establishment clause is not violated.
10. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Id. at 16. Even though a wall must separate church from state the separation
is not absolute. The general benefits of state law may extend to the religious and nonreligious alike. The establishment clause requires the government to be neutral between
groups of religious believers and non-believers. Id. at 18. For a list of permissible
federal aid to parochial schools, see D. FELLMAN, THE LiMITS OF FREEDOM 40-41 (1959).
13. 330 U.S. at 16.
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Everson test, if a statute is found to b-enefit the public by aiding school
children rather than religious schools, the establishment clause is not
violated.' 4 The decision in Abington School District v. Schempp"'
added a second guideline known as the "secular purpose and primary
'effect test." The Court ruled that reading the Bible to public school
children was a religious exercise which had the primary effect of advancing religion and was therefore impermissible under the establishment
16
clause.
The Court in Board of Education v. Allen' 7 expanded the area of
permissible state aid to parochual schools. By holding a textbook loan
program to be constitutional, the Court determined that the secular and
religious portions of education could be separated in a parochial school
so the primary effect of the law neither advanced nor inhibited religion,
but "merely made available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books. . The financial benefit is to parents and
children, not to schools." Is While Allen allows government aid to the
14. The Everson test is called the child-benefit theory. For criticism of this test
see Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1680 (1969); Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablisbment and Doctrinal Development: Part 11. The Nonestablisl ment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1968). For state courts rejecting this
theory see, e.g., Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 936 (Alas. 1961); Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927
(1963); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); Visser v. Nooksack
Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
15. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either
is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That
is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
.,
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222.
16. Id. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring). A statute which has merely an incidental effect of aiding religion is not
a violation of the establishment clause under this test. In determining whether the
effect of a statute is primary or incidental a court must examine other means to determine
if the state could reasonably have attained the secular end by means which do not
further the promotion of religion. 366 U.S. at 459. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961) (religious oath of office); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(Sunday closing law).
17 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. Id. at 243-44. The difference between Allen and Schenzpp is illustrated m Horace
Mann League of the Umted States of America, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md.
645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966). In Mann, the court applied the Schempp test to determine
whether four church-related colleges were eligible for government matching constracnion grants. The grants were not allowed to three of the colleges because they were too
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secular function 9 of church-related schools, the permissible extent of
such aid is undefined. 20
In Walz v. Tax Comnsson,2' the Court held that although the
grantmg of a tax-exempt status to church affiliated schools has the effect
of aiding religion, such a degree of government involvement with religion
is permissible; but where the involvement results in actual sponsorship
of religion, then the degree is excessive.22 The degree of entanglement
test is a modification of the Schempp "primary purpose and effect
test." 23 Walz declares: "IT] he questions are whether the involvement
is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." 24 Under Schempp, a statute violates the establishment clause
when its purpose or primary effect aids or hinders religion, while Walz
focuses instead on the degree of involvement between church and
state.
In Lemon, the Schempp and Walz tests were not viewed as conflicting but were treated as cumulative criteria. Chief Justice Burger
announced that: "Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' "15 The concept of excessive
entanglement limits aid which, under Allen, is allowed to the secular
heavily under religious dounation. Aid to such colleges would have had a primary
effect of advancing religion. Under Allen, however, aid could go to the secular portion
of a religious school. Lemon qualifies Allen in that such an aid program cannot result
in excessive government entanglement with religion.
19. Under the Allen test the scope of state aid is greatly enlarged. "It is doubtful
that there is a legislature in the land so tongue-tied that it could not find a multitude
of secular purposes to cover any religious interest it wished to accommodate." La
Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation and Medical
Care, 13 J. PuB. L. 76, 77-78 (1964).
20. Whether secular aid can be excessive and thus, under Schempp, have a primary
effect of aiding religion, is an unresolved question in Allen. But see DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1969), wherein the court stated: "[G]overnment aid to
" too deeply Id. at 120.
purely secular activity may nevertheless involve the State
(Emphasis supplied).
21. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
22. Earlier Court decisions suggested that the problem is one of degree. See, e.g.,
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
23. Schemnpp is not cited in the Walz opinion.
24. 397 U.S. at 675.
25. 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
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part of a church-related school. Secular aid is permissible only if government is not overly involved with religion.
Although the new concept of excessive entanglement is more clearly
defined in Lemon the Court has not provided adequate guidelines against
which the many remaining questions may be judged. 2 Government is
heavily entangled with religious schools in such areas as lunch programs,
medical clinics, teacher certification, textbook loans, and transportation.
These forms of secular assistance involve government with religion, yet
not excessively The reasons why this is so are obscure. Furthermore,
the line dividing permissible from impermissible entanglement is unclear. To clarify an area of the law that is fast becoming as muddled
as a Serbian bog the Court should abandon the doctrine of excessive
entanglement and rely, instead, upon Schempp and Allen. Aid to the
secular portion of a religious school should be permissible so long as
the purpose or primary effect of the aid program does not directly
advance religious teaching.
STEPHAN

Constitutional Law-CLEAR

J.

BOARDMAN

AND PRESENT DANGER TEST APPLIED

TO OVERBROAD 'UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY STATUTE.

Owens v. Common-

wealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477 (1971)
The appellants, members of an unruly crowd who ignored a police

order to disperse, were convicted of the statutory offense of remaining
at the place of an unlawful assembly after having been lawfully warned
to disperse.' On appeal, they claimed that the statute was an impernussible infringement upon their first amendment right "peaceably to assemble." 2
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the
26. Whether a particular program, such as the "voucher" plan, results in excessive
entanglement can only be determined on a case-by-case analysis. In Lemon, the Court
examned "the character and purposes of the istutons which [were] benefited, the
nature of the aid that the state provide[d], and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority" 91 S. Ct. at 2112. Other factors examined
were whether the program was innovative, self-perpetuating and self-expanding. Id. at
2117
1. VA. CoDE ANN. 18.1-254.4 (Supp. 1971)- "Remaining at a place of riot, rout, or
unlawful assembly after warning to disperse.-Every person except public officers and
persons assisting them, remaining present at the place of any riot, rout, or unlawful
assembly after having been lawfully warned to disperse, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. L "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . .. "

